(a)

the original audit plan reported the following areas of focus: valuation of property, plant and equipment, valuation of pension liability, reduction of the net Pension Liability through the use of Miel Ltd, accounting treatment for Government Grants, and standard risks including management over-ride controls through journals testing and financial instruments;

(b)

there was an addition to the Audit Plan in 19/20 regarding the Miel pension liability transaction – several recommendations had been made to the Audit and Governance Committee throughout the year however it was considered that sufficient progress had not been made against those recommendations. Therefore an additional area of focus was added include a specific review of the governance and due diligence arrangements regarding Miel transactions and the progress made against those recommendations;

(c)

auditors continued to test financial instruments; some amendments would be made to them. Officers were obtaining further information regarding fair values.

(a)

the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards (PSIAS) required the Council to periodically prepare a risk-based plan of Internal Audit activity designed to support an annual opinion on the effectiveness of the systems of governance, risk management and internal control; this was informed by the audit strategy, consultation with stakeholders and a dynamic assessment of risks;

(b)

Internal Audit officers had liaised with senior management to develop the 2021/22 Audit Plan however the plan was flexible in order to incorporate, as appropriate, any new risks which may arise. Any changes to the 2021/22 Audit Plan would be brought back to the Audit and Governance Committee;

(c)

Devon Audit Partnership would continue to investigate instances of potential fraud and irregularities and would also conduct pro-active anti-fraud and corruption testing of systems considered to be most at risk to fraud;

(d)

during the unprecedented COVID 19 crisis the Government provided a package of support mechanisms for individuals and business and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) require proportionate ‘assurance’ that the Governments Grant Funding for schemes has been used to support only those who were legitimately entitled to claim. The DAP Internal Audit and Counter Fraud Team are working collaboratively to provide assurance to the Council.

(e)

the auditing process for covid support government grants for businesses – would this form part of the audit plan for 21/22, how much time would be allocated to audit this area of work, what was the nature and the process of the audit?

(f)

would work identify fictitious companies that were set up fraudulently in order to benefit from these grants?

(g)

were officers finding it more difficult to recover proven fraudulent overpayments?

(a)

whose ultimate responsibility was it for checking purchases made on the card? The line manager who authorised the purchase or the Service Director for Finance?

(b)

what measures were checked in order to ensure the card was not being used fraudulently or misused?

(a)

the report provided a progress update upon the audit of the electoral register following the May 2020 local elections; the new process involved in administering the Reformed Annual Canvass of Electors and redeployment of a number of electoral services team member caused the delay in starting the audit (which commenced in November 2020);

(b)

the Council had benefitted from the advice of Devon Audit Partnership’s system approach as well as the Association of Electoral Administrators who focused in more detail at specific registration and electoral preparation issues;

(c)

the review focused around developing a zero tolerance approach to avoidable mistakes linked to data manipulation and the preparation of registers;

(d)

in terms of formal assurance, the review focused upon three specific areas: high levels of governance, the level of transparency demonstrated by the Council and its use of subject area experts;

(e)

a change in risk environment was identified as electronic means were used to engage with the electorate; this changed the risk as handling paper was different to handling electronic data. The Civica Xpress Electoral Management System also lacked formal control in terms of data handling;

(f)

it was identified that quality was about maintaining and enhancing senior management expectations of operational quality and assurance through the process of providing stakeholders with demonstrable compliance with agreed internal administrative processes and standards – the team would work on that so stakeholders had ongoing levels of assurance.

(a)

the position with regard to Operational Risk Register monitoring was last reported to the Audit and Governance Committee on 21 September 2020;  report provided a summary of the latest monitoring exercise covering the position as at 28 February 2021;

(b)

following the most recent review, the number of operational risks totalled 111, with two red risks, 63 medium risks and 46 green risks. Those identified as red risks were required to be managed down urgently. The first red risk related to the Council’s expenditure exceeding the resources available however the budget had now been set by the Council and work could continue during the financial envelope. The second red risk linked to the failure to obtain the Public Service Network compliance from the Cabinet Office however this was being addressed by the Information Governance Manager – a new submission was being prepared.