(a)

the five security levels were  –

·         Low (an attack is unlikely)

·         Moderate (an attack is possible but not likely)

·         Substantial (an attack is a strong possibility)

·         Severe (an attack is highly likely)

·         Critical (an attack is expected imminently)

(b)

the UK had been at ‘Severe’ level since August 2014, and the specific threat to the Police had been increased to ‘Severe’ in January 2015.  The armed forces, the Jewish community and various American interests were also on this threat level;

(c)

planning was taking place across Devon, Cornwall and Dorset in how to respond if the threat level was increased to ‘Critical;

(d)

following on from the terrorist attacks in Paris, the Police had looked at it’s capability locally, regionally and nationally;

(e)

a minimum number of suitably equipped Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs) were in operation 24 hours a day across the three counties;

(f)

the majority of firearms incidents in the three counties were not related to terrorism, however there were adequate resources and suitably trained staff to deal with such an incident;

(g)

the deployment of resources would be uplifted if required by the Home Secretary.

In response to questions, Members were advised that –

(h)

suitably trained officers were available at all times to deal with terrorist incidents;

(i)

training of officers had evolved over recent years to cope with the change in the type of incidents the Police encountered;

(j)

resources from Devon and Cornwall Police would be deployed if required to other parts of the country to assist with any incident (under the ‘mutual aid’ agreement), however this would not be to the detriment of Devon and Cornwall;

(k)

details of funding for the ARVs (and the Police in general) would be known soon;

(l)

a high number of Police officers were Taser trained, firearms training for Police officers covered various scenarios;

(m)

the Police (and armed forces) responded to the ever changing security threat and resources would be uplifted as and when required.

(a)

it was essential that different police computer systems worked in unison;

(b)

funding for PCSOs was a complex issue, and it was the Chief Constable’s responsibility to make a statement regarding this issue, hopefully before the Christmas period;

(c)

‘non crime’ included issues such as mental health, missing persons, calls to welfare, calls on police to ensure the safety of a person;

(d)

PCCs and Chief Constables in the south west region (south west of Gloucestershire) understood the importance of moving forward in regionalisation, but this issue had to be handled with care;

(e)

there was a possibility that middle management would be recruited from other industries in to the Police in the future;

(f)

the possibility of Devon and Cornwall Police and the PCC merging with Dorset Police and their PCC in the future, could not be totally ruled out, although it was acknowledged that this would take time and would be a complex process; any potential business case would be brought to the Panel for review.  Partnership and collaboration between police forces across the peninsular was an alternative;

(g)

any future regionalisation or collaboration would be carefully considered and no hasty decisions would be made, any ideas would be brought to future Panel meetings;

(h)

the funding formula would be considered by a range of independent bodies in the future.

(a)

it was positive to note that the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme, introduced 30 years ago, was still in existence, albeit in a different format;

(b)

there was potential for the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme to develop further, and it was necessary for local communities to be involved with this scheme for it to work.

(1)

the 3 recommendations contained in the report;

(2)

that the definition of what neighbourhood policing is and means, what the offer is, what can be shared with partners and what can and ultimately cannot be done, is addressed as part of the 2016 budget precept item in February 2016;

(3)

that the PCC attends the April 2016 meeting to provide an update in terms of the operational aspects of the recommendations which are the responsibility of the Chief Constable.

(a)

the Special Constabulary was not properly integrated with the regular workforce in a way that would enhance it’s capability and capacity, and improve policing in Devon and Cornwall;

(b)

there was a need to transform the Special Constabulary, including better deployment and training of it’s members, although there was a reluctance to do this;

(c)

there was an unsatisfactory level of volunteering within the Police force, although there were a few positive aspects, such as Street Pastors and the Police Cadet Scheme;

(d)

proposals had been made to the Chief Constable for the development of the Special Constabulary, including large scale recruitment, upskilling of the workforce, integration in to the regular workforce, and ways of deploying Special Constables to local teams.  These proposals would prove to be expensive, but were considered worthwhile;

(e)

the Police and Crime Commissioner had made it clear to the Chief Constable that he was prepared to resource this endeavour, which would cost in excess of £1 million;

(f)

the Chief Constable’s position on this proposal was not yet known, although it was thought that he was in support of it;

(g)

the Police and Crime Commissioner was willing to support the establishment of an effective volunteer infrastructure, and was keen to determine the roles that could be established within local communities;

(h)

it was agreed that the PCC would provide a further written update report for the Panel to review at its meeting in April.

In response to questions, Members were advised that –

(i)

it was accepted that that there was a structural separation between the Regular and Special Constabulary, however it was acknowledged that the 2 Constabularies needed to work together in the future;

(j)

there were currently 72 voluntary care organisations within the Victim Care Hub, who delivered support to victims of crime;

(k)

there was potential to work more closely with other ‘blue light’ services in the future to provide support to local communities;

(l)

there was a requirement for a suitable volunteer support mechanism with the Police;

(m)

the Special Constabulary report had been supplied by a consultant, Volunteering Values Ltd and it was recognised that both reports were difficult to understand and of poor quality.  A request was made for the Panel to be provided with the cost of Volunteering Values’ report;

(n)

it was important that members of the Special Constabulary showed a commitment to their own community;

(o)

there was too great an emphasis on the Special Constabulary being a route in to the regular workforce;

(p)

there was a formal process in place for the dismissal of members of the Special Constabulary;

(q)

plans to recruit ‘specialist’ Special Constables (to deal with issues such as cyber crime) were ongoing;

(r)

following the demise of a number of  ...  view the full minutes text for item 39.

(a)

the custody centre review was one small part of the Criminal Justice review;

(b)

the Criminal Justice Department aimed to save £1 million per annum, and recent figures had indicated £1.4 million had been saved;

(c)

numerous options had been considered to save money, and it had become apparent that the most effective way would be through a closure;

(d)

7 estates had been identified for potential closure in order to make the required savings;

(e)

various factors had been considered to identify the most suitable estate for closure, including the number of prisoners processed per annum, distance from other custody centres and running costs;

(f)

Launceston had been identified as the most suitable estate as it was considered the closure would  cause the least impact and risk to the local community;

(g)

regular meetings were held with local Police Commanders to assess the impact on the local community, as of yet no adverse impact on the surrounding area had been reported.

In response to questions, Members were advised that –

(h)

Launceston custody centre was currently mothballed, and if required could be re-opened immediately and there was also the fall-back of being able to open Crownhill.  Both Bude and Launceston had received extra funding for CCTV;

(i)

Special Constables could be used to move prisoners between locations if necessary, it was a requirement that vehicles were ‘double crewed’ for this purpose;

(j)

custody centres were located at Camborne, Newquay, Plymouth (Charles Cross), Torquay, Barnstaple and Exeter, a number of sites also had custody cells which could be activated as and when required;

(k)

the custody centre review was ongoing as part of the strategic alliance with Dorset Police, and it was acknowledged that it could prove geographically difficult to share these facilities with Dorset;

(l)

it was essential that staff at custody centres were not under-utilised in down times;

(m)

a number of towns were left unpoliced while transportation of prisoners took  place, which was a great concern to local communities.  If such a situation arose it was managed in order to lessen the impact on the local community;

(n)

crime rates had fallen, and different methods to deal with offenders were now available, such as restorative justice and the issuing of penalty notices;

(o)

plans were in existence for a Criminal Justice Hub on the Middlemoor site, and sufficient funds were now in place to enable this development to go ahead.

(a)

in terms of victim-based crime, Devon and Cornwall were currently ranked 4^th in England and Wales;

(b)

the Police were no longer the first point of contact to report a crime – they now ranked 3^rd, behind family members and volunteers;

(c)

50% of sexual offences related to historical offences,  and the ‘You are not alone’  project had been introduced to support victims;

(d)

the Performance and Accountability Board met bi-monthly in different locations across the peninsula, and the next meeting would be held in Truro on 28 January 2016.

In response to questions, Members were advised that –

(e)

the target for answering an emergency (999) call was 10 seconds.  The Panel would be provided with a written update report in respect of the 101 issue at the next meeting;

(f)

the crimes of female genital mutilation (FGM), honour based violence, trafficking and modern slavery were high on the agenda for the Chief Constable, and it was agreed that narrative in relation to these crimes would be included against the overarching performance measure in future performance reports.

(a)

details of the Police funding settlement for 2016–17 would be known on 17 December 2015;

(b)

the strategic alliance would begin to have an impact on the Police workforce in January 2016;

(c)

a written update report in relation to the Strategic Alliance with Dorset to include an update in relation to the custody centre closures would be provided to the Panel at its April 2016 meeting.